Emma Thorpe
10cc6cceed
Separate user identity (data) from the reusable modules, and let a host declare any number of users instead of exactly one. - users/registry.nix: per-user identity (name, email, groups, authorized and signing keys) as the single source of identity; no user data is hardcoded in the modules. - mkHost takes a `users` set keyed by username; per-user identity is injected into each home config via the `identity` module arg (extraSpecialArgs is per-host, so it cannot carry per-user data). - modules/users.nix builds accounts from the registry; modules/ssh.nix no longer defines authorized keys (the registry owns them); home/git.nix and home/desktop.nix read `identity`; users/emmathorpe/work.nix drops its now-redundant git identity override. - Restructure the tree: users/, home/, modules/, hosts/, lib/ replace the former lyrathorpe/ and system/ layout. - Add standalone homeConfigurations (the portable subset: shell, git, editor, claude) and an exported homeModules output for use on machines not managed by this flake, or as an input to other flakes. Behaviour-preserving for existing hosts: lyrathorpe-mbp and emmathorpe-edaas evaluate to identical derivations; lyrathorpe-t400, lyrathorpe-macpro31 and lyrathorpe-rpi5 differ only by de-duplicating a repeated authorized_keys entry. Fixes the SSH authorized-key leak (one user's key was applied to every account), the hardcoded default git identity, and the hardcoded EDaaS linger setting.
1.2 KiB
1.2 KiB
name, description, metadata
| name | description | metadata | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| feedback-sandbox-prompts | Don't ask Lyra to approve sandbox-disable or routine read-only shell prompts; add adjacent repos to additionalDirectories and broaden allow rules instead |
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Don't repeatedly prompt Lyra for dangerouslyDisableSandbox or for routine
read-only shell actions (git inspection, file iteration, echo, sed, grep, head,
rm of files she told me to clean up). The friction is the prompt itself.
Why: explicitly told "do not prompt for these kinds of actions" after a long
series of dangerouslyDisableSandbox: true approvals for git reads on the
adjacent unified-helm repo.
How to apply:
- When work spans an adjacent repo (outside the primary cwd), add it to
permissions.additionalDirectoriesin~/.claude/settings.jsonimmediately on first use, so the sandbox no longer blocks writes to.git/. - Broaden
permissions.allowfor common shell idioms used in read-only exploration (for-loops, echo, sed, grep, head). Keep network ops denied per git-network-ops. - Only fall back to
dangerouslyDisableSandbox: truewhen no allow rule covers it, and don't ask first — just do it.