CI / flake (push) Successful in 3m26s
## Summary Separates user identity (data) from the reusable Nix modules and lets a host declare any number of users, replacing the previous one-user-per-host structure. Also restructures the tree and exposes the home config for use off these hosts. ## Changes - **User registry** (`users/registry.nix`): per-user identity (name, email, groups, authorized + signing keys) as the single source of truth; no user data hardcoded in modules. - **Multi-user `mkHost`**: a host declares a `users` set keyed by username; per-user identity is injected into each home config via the `identity` module arg. - **Restructured layout**: `users/`, `home/`, `modules/`, `hosts/`, `lib/` replace the former `lyrathorpe/` and `system/` trees. - **Portable outputs**: standalone `homeConfigurations."<user>@<system>"` (the portable subset — shell, git, editor, claude) plus an exported `homeModules` for use on machines not managed by this flake, or as an input to other flakes. - Docs (`README.md`, `home/README.md`) and `.gitignore` updated for the new paths. ## Fixes - Closes #46 — shared user module authorized one user's SSH key for every account. - Closes #47 — git committer identity hardcoded as defaults instead of per-user. - Closes #48 — EDaaS systemd linger hardcoded to a literal username. ## Verification - `nix flake check` passes: treefmt, deadnix, statix, pre-commit, and evaluation of all NixOS hosts + Darwin + homeConfigurations. - Derivation-path comparison vs `main`: `lyrathorpe-mbp` and `emmathorpe-edaas` are byte-identical; `lyrathorpe-t400`, `lyrathorpe-macpro31` and `lyrathorpe-rpi5` differ only by de-duplicating a repeated `authorized_keys` entry (confirmed with nix-diff — no other change). - Standalone `homeConfigurations."lyrathorpe@x86_64-linux".activationPackage` builds. ## Notes - `emmathorpe` has no personal authorized key yet (it previously inherited Lyra's key via the bug in #46); the registry entry is intentionally empty — add a real key if SSH login as `emmathorpe` is wanted (moot on the WSL host). - A two-repo (public dotfiles / private systems) split is deferred by design; this internal restructure is the prerequisite for it. --------- Co-authored-by: Emma Thorpe <emma.thorpe@citrix.com> Reviewed-on: #49
1.2 KiB
1.2 KiB
name, description, metadata
| name | description | metadata | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| feedback-sandbox-prompts | Don't ask Lyra to approve sandbox-disable or routine read-only shell prompts; add adjacent repos to additionalDirectories and broaden allow rules instead |
|
Don't repeatedly prompt Lyra for dangerouslyDisableSandbox or for routine
read-only shell actions (git inspection, file iteration, echo, sed, grep, head,
rm of files she told me to clean up). The friction is the prompt itself.
Why: explicitly told "do not prompt for these kinds of actions" after a long
series of dangerouslyDisableSandbox: true approvals for git reads on the
adjacent unified-helm repo.
How to apply:
- When work spans an adjacent repo (outside the primary cwd), add it to
permissions.additionalDirectoriesin~/.claude/settings.jsonimmediately on first use, so the sandbox no longer blocks writes to.git/. - Broaden
permissions.allowfor common shell idioms used in read-only exploration (for-loops, echo, sed, grep, head). Keep network ops denied per git-network-ops. - Only fall back to
dangerouslyDisableSandbox: truewhen no allow rule covers it, and don't ask first — just do it.