refactor(flake): user registry, multi-user hosts, and portable home outputs (#49)
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## Summary Separates user identity (data) from the reusable Nix modules and lets a host declare any number of users, replacing the previous one-user-per-host structure. Also restructures the tree and exposes the home config for use off these hosts. ## Changes - **User registry** (`users/registry.nix`): per-user identity (name, email, groups, authorized + signing keys) as the single source of truth; no user data hardcoded in modules. - **Multi-user `mkHost`**: a host declares a `users` set keyed by username; per-user identity is injected into each home config via the `identity` module arg. - **Restructured layout**: `users/`, `home/`, `modules/`, `hosts/`, `lib/` replace the former `lyrathorpe/` and `system/` trees. - **Portable outputs**: standalone `homeConfigurations."<user>@<system>"` (the portable subset — shell, git, editor, claude) plus an exported `homeModules` for use on machines not managed by this flake, or as an input to other flakes. - Docs (`README.md`, `home/README.md`) and `.gitignore` updated for the new paths. ## Fixes - Closes #46 — shared user module authorized one user's SSH key for every account. - Closes #47 — git committer identity hardcoded as defaults instead of per-user. - Closes #48 — EDaaS systemd linger hardcoded to a literal username. ## Verification - `nix flake check` passes: treefmt, deadnix, statix, pre-commit, and evaluation of all NixOS hosts + Darwin + homeConfigurations. - Derivation-path comparison vs `main`: `lyrathorpe-mbp` and `emmathorpe-edaas` are byte-identical; `lyrathorpe-t400`, `lyrathorpe-macpro31` and `lyrathorpe-rpi5` differ only by de-duplicating a repeated `authorized_keys` entry (confirmed with nix-diff — no other change). - Standalone `homeConfigurations."lyrathorpe@x86_64-linux".activationPackage` builds. ## Notes - `emmathorpe` has no personal authorized key yet (it previously inherited Lyra's key via the bug in #46); the registry entry is intentionally empty — add a real key if SSH login as `emmathorpe` is wanted (moot on the WSL host). - A two-repo (public dotfiles / private systems) split is deferred by design; this internal restructure is the prerequisite for it. --------- Co-authored-by: Emma Thorpe <emma.thorpe@citrix.com> Reviewed-on: #49
This commit was merged in pull request #49.
This commit is contained in:
Emma Thorpe
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# Raspberry Pi 5 (`lyrathorpe-rpi5`)
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Headless `aarch64-linux` server with two roles:
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- **Docker host** — daemon exposed over the network (`docker.nix`).
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- **nginx reverse proxy** — declarative `virtualHosts` (`reverse-proxy.nix`).
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## Install
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1. Flash a NixOS `aarch64` SD image (or USB) and boot the Pi. The
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`raspberry-pi-5` profile from `nixos-hardware` (wired in the flake host table)
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supplies the kernel, firmware and device tree; boot is U-Boot + extlinux.
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2. Partition/mount the target, then **regenerate the hardware config on the
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device** and replace the committed placeholder:
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```sh
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nixos-generate-config --root /mnt
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# copy /mnt/etc/nixos/hardware-configuration.nix over
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# system/machine/RPi5/hardware-configuration.nix in this repo, then commit
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```
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`hardware-configuration.nix` in this directory is a **placeholder** committed
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only so the host evaluates in CI. The machine will not boot correctly until it
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is replaced with the generated one.
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3. Set the host name to match the flake attribute (already done in
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`configuration.nix`: `lyrathorpe-rpi5`) and build:
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```sh
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sudo nixos-rebuild switch --flake .#lyrathorpe-rpi5
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# or, once the hostname is live:
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nh os switch
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```
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4. Give the login user a password (`passwd lyrathorpe`) and confirm the key in
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`system/modules/ssh.nix` is the one you will connect with.
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## Docker socket (security)
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The daemon listens on **plain TCP `2375`, no TLS, no auth**. Access is
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root-equivalent on this host. The only protection is the nftables rule in
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`docker.nix`, which accepts `2375` **only** from the trusted LAN subnet
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(`10.187.1.0/24` by default — change it to match your network). Do not widen
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that subnet to anything untrusted.
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From a LAN client:
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```sh
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export DOCKER_HOST=tcp://lyrathorpe-rpi5:2375
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docker info
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```
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The secure upgrade path is mutual TLS on `2376` (`--tlsverify` with a CA and
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client certs); it needs out-of-band cert provisioning and is intentionally not
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wired here.
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## Adding a reverse-proxy site
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Each proxied service is a Nix entry in `reverse-proxy.nix`:
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```nix
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services.nginx.virtualHosts."app.example.lan" = {
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# enableACME = true; forceSSL = true; # once a DNS name + cert exist
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locations."/" = {
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proxyPass = "http://127.0.0.1:8080"; # e.g. a local container
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proxyWebsockets = true;
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};
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};
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```
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The example vhost is HTTP-only by design. Turn on `enableACME`/`forceSSL`
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per-vhost once the host has a real DNS name and the ACME challenge can be met;
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`443` is already open in the firewall.
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# Raspberry Pi 5 (aarch64) headless server. Two roles, split into submodules:
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# ./docker.nix (Docker host with a network socket) and ./reverse-proxy.nix
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# (native nginx). The raspberry-pi-5 nixos-hardware profile (kernel, firmware,
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# device tree) and key-only sshd (../../modules/ssh.nix) are layered on in the
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# flake host table. Install notes: see ./README.md.
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{ ... }:
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{
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imports = [
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./hardware-configuration.nix
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./docker.nix
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./reverse-proxy.nix
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];
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# Match the flake's nixosConfigurations attribute name so `nh os switch`
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# (which selects by the local hostname) resolves without an explicit -H flag.
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networking.hostName = "lyrathorpe-rpi5";
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# Headless server: the Sway desktop is intentionally not set up. modules/sway.nix is
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# not imported and features.swayDesktop.enable defaults to false (declared in
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# system/modules/features.nix), so this host keeps plain TTY/SSH login.
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# Raspberry Pi boots via U-Boot + extlinux, not GRUB/systemd-boot. The
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# raspberry-pi-5 nixos-hardware profile supplies the kernel, firmware and
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# device tree.
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boot.loader.grub.enable = false;
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boot.loader.generic-extlinux-compatible.enable = true;
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# Remote administration. Key-only policy and the authorized key come from
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# ../../modules/ssh.nix; here we just enable the daemon and open the port.
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services.openssh.enable = true;
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# Default-deny inbound. Open only SSH here; the Docker and nginx submodules
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# open their own ports (Docker via a source-restricted nftables rule, nginx
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# via 80/443). List-valued, so these merge with the submodule definitions.
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networking.firewall.enable = true;
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networking.firewall.allowedTCPPorts = [ 22 ];
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# See `man configuration.nix` / the stateVersion docs before changing.
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system.stateVersion = "26.05";
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}
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# Docker host with the daemon socket exposed over the network.
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#
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# SECURITY: the daemon listens on plain TCP 2375 with NO TLS and NO auth. Access
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# to that port is root-equivalent on this host (the Docker API can mount the
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# host filesystem and run privileged containers). The ONLY thing protecting it
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# is the nftables rule below, which accepts 2375 solely from the trusted LAN
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# subnet. Do not widen that subnet to anything you do not fully trust. The
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# secure upgrade path is mutual TLS on 2376 (--tlsverify with client certs);
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# that needs out-of-band cert provisioning and is intentionally not wired here.
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{ ... }:
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{
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virtualisation.docker.enable = true;
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# Expose the daemon over TCP by extending systemd socket activation rather than
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# setting daemon.settings.hosts. The NixOS docker unit starts dockerd with
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# `-H fd://` and takes its listeners from this socket; putting `hosts` in
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# daemon.json as well would conflict with that and dockerd would refuse to
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# start. Adding the TCP listener here keeps a single source of truth.
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# The leading "" resets the unit's default (unix-socket-only) ListenStream list.
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systemd.sockets.docker.socketConfig.ListenStream = [
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""
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"/run/docker.sock"
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"0.0.0.0:2375"
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];
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# Source-restricted firewall rule for the Docker TCP port. 2375 is deliberately
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# NOT added to networking.firewall.allowedTCPPorts (that would open it to every
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# source); instead nftables accepts it only from the trusted subnet. Adjust the
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# CIDR to match the LAN that should reach the Docker API.
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networking.nftables.enable = true;
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networking.firewall.extraInputRules = ''
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ip saddr 10.187.1.0/24 tcp dport 2375 accept
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'';
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}
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# PLACEHOLDER hardware configuration for the Raspberry Pi 5.
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#
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# This file is NOT the real generated config -- it exists only so the host
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# evaluates in CI before the Pi is provisioned. The machine will not boot from
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# it as-is. On first install, regenerate this file on the device with
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# nixos-generate-config --root /mnt
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# and replace this placeholder with the output (commit it). See ./README.md.
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#
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# Like every hardware-configuration.nix in this repo, this file is excluded from
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# the formatter and linters (see the pre-commit/treefmt excludes in flake.nix).
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{ modulesPath, ... }:
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{
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imports = [ (modulesPath + "/installer/scan/not-detected.nix") ];
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nixpkgs.hostPlatform = "aarch64-linux";
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# The Raspberry Pi 5 boots from an SD card / USB with a FAT firmware partition
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# and an ext4 root. Labels match the conventional sd-image layout; the real
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# generated config will use by-uuid device paths instead.
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fileSystems."/" = {
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device = "/dev/disk/by-label/NIXOS_SD";
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fsType = "ext4";
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};
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fileSystems."/boot/firmware" = {
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device = "/dev/disk/by-label/FIRMWARE";
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fsType = "vfat";
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};
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swapDevices = [ ];
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
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# Native nginx reverse proxy. The proxy configuration is declarative Nix:
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# every proxied service is an entry under services.nginx.virtualHosts, so the
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# whole routing table lives in this file and is built/version-controlled with
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# the rest of the system.
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#
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# To add a proxied service, add another virtualHosts."<host>" entry following
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# the example below. To serve it over HTTPS, uncomment enableACME + forceSSL on
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# that vhost once it has a real DNS name and the ACME HTTP-01/DNS-01 challenge
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# can be satisfied (see security.acme for the account/email and DNS settings).
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{ ... }:
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{
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services.nginx = {
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enable = true;
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recommendedProxySettings = true; # sane proxy_set_header defaults (Host, X-Forwarded-*)
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recommendedTlsSettings = true;
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recommendedOptimisation = true;
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recommendedGzipSettings = true;
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virtualHosts = {
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# Example reverse-proxy vhost. Replace the name and upstream with a real
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# service (e.g. a container published by the Docker host on this machine).
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"example.lan" = {
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# enableACME = true; # request a Let's Encrypt cert for this host
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# forceSSL = true; # redirect HTTP -> HTTPS once the cert exists
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locations."/" = {
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proxyPass = "http://127.0.0.1:8080";
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proxyWebsockets = true; # forward Upgrade/Connection for WebSocket apps
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};
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};
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};
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};
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# Public reverse-proxy ports. 443 is opened now so flipping a vhost to TLS
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# needs no firewall change.
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networking.firewall.allowedTCPPorts = [
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80
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443
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];
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}
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