refactor(flake): add user registry and multi-user host support

Separate user identity (data) from the reusable modules, and let a host
declare any number of users instead of exactly one.

- users/registry.nix: per-user identity (name, email, groups, authorized
  and signing keys) as the single source of identity; no user data is
  hardcoded in the modules.
- mkHost takes a `users` set keyed by username; per-user identity is
  injected into each home config via the `identity` module arg
  (extraSpecialArgs is per-host, so it cannot carry per-user data).
- modules/users.nix builds accounts from the registry; modules/ssh.nix no
  longer defines authorized keys (the registry owns them); home/git.nix
  and home/desktop.nix read `identity`; users/emmathorpe/work.nix drops
  its now-redundant git identity override.
- Restructure the tree: users/, home/, modules/, hosts/, lib/ replace the
  former lyrathorpe/ and system/ layout.
- Add standalone homeConfigurations (the portable subset: shell, git,
  editor, claude) and an exported homeModules output for use on machines
  not managed by this flake, or as an input to other flakes.

Behaviour-preserving for existing hosts: lyrathorpe-mbp and
emmathorpe-edaas evaluate to identical derivations; lyrathorpe-t400,
lyrathorpe-macpro31 and lyrathorpe-rpi5 differ only by de-duplicating a
repeated authorized_keys entry. Fixes the SSH authorized-key leak (one
user's key was applied to every account), the hardcoded default git
identity, and the hardcoded EDaaS linger setting.
This commit is contained in:
Emma Thorpe
2026-06-29 12:27:52 +01:00
parent 906fae7e7b
commit 10cc6cceed
59 changed files with 286 additions and 175 deletions
+34
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# Docker host with the daemon socket exposed over the network.
#
# SECURITY: the daemon listens on plain TCP 2375 with NO TLS and NO auth. Access
# to that port is root-equivalent on this host (the Docker API can mount the
# host filesystem and run privileged containers). The ONLY thing protecting it
# is the nftables rule below, which accepts 2375 solely from the trusted LAN
# subnet. Do not widen that subnet to anything you do not fully trust. The
# secure upgrade path is mutual TLS on 2376 (--tlsverify with client certs);
# that needs out-of-band cert provisioning and is intentionally not wired here.
{ ... }:
{
virtualisation.docker.enable = true;
# Expose the daemon over TCP by extending systemd socket activation rather than
# setting daemon.settings.hosts. The NixOS docker unit starts dockerd with
# `-H fd://` and takes its listeners from this socket; putting `hosts` in
# daemon.json as well would conflict with that and dockerd would refuse to
# start. Adding the TCP listener here keeps a single source of truth.
# The leading "" resets the unit's default (unix-socket-only) ListenStream list.
systemd.sockets.docker.socketConfig.ListenStream = [
""
"/run/docker.sock"
"0.0.0.0:2375"
];
# Source-restricted firewall rule for the Docker TCP port. 2375 is deliberately
# NOT added to networking.firewall.allowedTCPPorts (that would open it to every
# source); instead nftables accepts it only from the trusted subnet. Adjust the
# CIDR to match the LAN that should reach the Docker API.
networking.nftables.enable = true;
networking.firewall.extraInputRules = ''
ip saddr 10.187.1.0/24 tcp dport 2375 accept
'';
}